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ABSTRACT
This research explores the various security and post-conflict complications that are in part
a result of the global proliferation of small arms — including organized crime, rebellion, civil
war, and fractionalization of the state. The paper 1) defines the issue, 2) contextualizes why the
issue matters, and 3) evaluates the effectiveness of policies at the international level. I define the
actors in the debate, defines the solutions at regional and international levels, and draw
conclusions about the effectiveness of weapons collection, destruction, disarmament, tracing,
import and export control, and associated legislation. I find that serious violence-reducing
measures should include: increasing the role of local law enforcement organizations capable of
carrying out meaningful and region-specific legislation, tightening border controls, uniform

implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, and effectively disarming and
integrating former opposition groups in post-conflict societies.
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1

INTRODUCTION
The post-Cold-War period left many questions about the state of international affairs,

security, and, more specifically, arms control. A state-centric, great power model of international
affairs dissolved with the Soviet Union, and there were still a host of problems yet to deal with
including nuclear disarmament, regionally rooted conflicts, border disputes, and a host of
religious and ethnic grievances among developing nations. In many ways it seems as though the
developing world, once used a proxy measure for Soviet or American strength, interpreted the
end of the Cold War as a signal to confront longstanding, historically rooted tensions.
Today, intra-state conflicts are observed all over the developing world. Examples include
domestic instability that occurred, and continues to occur, during the Arab Spring (Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt), ongoing civil conflict in Syria, organized crimes committed by Boko Haram in
Nigeria, the creeping (and now overt) role of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, or the
prevalence of global drug networks across multiple continents among other activities
undermining both sovereign authorities and overall global stability. The fuel keeping rebellions,
criminal networks, and civil conflicts moving are not conventional arms, rather, it is small and
light weapons. While conventional weapons are by no means out of commission (take the
Ukrainian crisis as an example of contemporary great-power confrontation), there is an
increasing presence of small and light weapons, which is the product a combination of factors –
including the large-scale use, and abandonment, of small arms during the Cold War, the
disarmament of the Soviet Union and other FSU states, the increasing rise of weapons
manufacturers, and the lax regulations of interstate small-arms trading.
During the 1990s, a handful of conventional arms scholars discussed the next threat to
international security, and developed the idea that small arms were the next destabilizing factor
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to international security on the grounds they contained specific properties not inherent in
conventional arms: small (and light) arms are low cost, portable, concealable, lethal, and easy to
trade, which makes grey- and black-market weapons trading so attractive to non-state actors
and/or terrorist organizations (Klare 1995, Latham 1995). While Cold War-era stockpiles already
existed within developing state borders, increasing production of weapons became more
globalized, and additional states began producing their own small arms (Bitzinger 1994). The
primary assumption was that small arms were already highly concentrated in developing nations
during the post-Cold War era, and it follows that as numbers increase so will the probability that
existing or dormant conflict (especially in troubled or low-functioning states) would continue
because of the ease of access to small and light stockpiles. These observations, in turn, sparked a
reactionary epistemic community composed of researchers, scholars, activists, states, and NGOs.
This research was prompted in part because of my personal experiences in conflict and
military affairs. Prior to beginning this research, I observed that contemporary conflict is
primarily fought with small (as opposed to conventional) arms, which prompted questions about
how opposition forces acquire such weapons. After some preliminary investigation, I found that
because state conduct during the Cold War focused on balancing power (and preventing total
war), small weapons were largely underemphasized in international security and viewed as
relatively inconsequential. Because of this Cold War-era policy shortcoming (in conjunction with
the rise of free-flowing information), hotbed issues such as global poverty, ethnically divisive
ideologies, terrorism, and the resurgence of asymmetrical and guerilla warfare has ensured that
small and light weapons are essential components of modern conflict. Further, economically
motivated criminals procure weapons to support networks and organizations capitalizing on past
policy failures. My first impression was that shortsighted Cold War policies serve as a stark
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reminder that, as the actor Phillip Baker Hall emphasizes in the film Magnolia, “we might be
through with the past, but the past ain't through with us.”
This paper accepts a constructivist conception of cooperative norm building, and
emphasizes an internationalist view of coordination among non-state actors. As such, this paper
accepts the position that negotiated policy is the result of multiple actors sharing information to
facilitate political deliberation to the end of implementing effective international standards. I
further assume that the goal, for arms-control advocates, is a universal legal framework
following multiple iterations of consensus norm building. The paper is internationalist in the
sense that actors other than states matter in the development of effective international controls,
and underemphasizes the condition of anarchy in the international system. This, however, does
not mean that anarchy is ignored. To the contrary, this paper accepts and assumes realist
assumptions that a state’s (as opposed to an NGO, researcher, academic, or third-party actor’s)
decisions emphasize national security over cooperative norm building; however, because I take
an internationalist approach, states are not the only actors in contemporary political conduct. At
the international level, negotiations are a constant battle between states vying to preserve
national security, and non-state actors vying to champion portions policy. Generally, I find that
an internationalist approaching emphasizing the role of multiple actors appropriately
contextualizes how small-arms policies emerged to overcome state emphasis on national
security. I conceive of the small arms issue as a problem that is the result of a combination of the
following: unaccountable state-based policies, opportunistic violence-seeking entrepreneurs,
largely unregulated international markets, weak state intuitions, and inconsistent border security.
This research attempts to demystify and clearly explain small arms issue-area development,
solutions, and effective controls. By exploring key developments in the small arms literature, this
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paper asks the question: Are small arms measures adequately dealing with the small arms
problem? To answer this question, this paper 1) evaluates how small arms are connected to the
broader concept of international security, 2) identifies key actors in the small-arms-control
advocacy community and how the issue evolved, 3) identifies and analyzes ongoing regulatory
efforts targeting the problem, and 4) evaluates research to determine whether or not these efforts
as a whole adequately help achieve the goal of reducing global violence. To these ends, this
paper is organized in three sections. The first section defines what the small and light arms
problem is, and highlights how the issue is framed at an international level. For the most part, the
small arms problem is portrayed as a transnational issue originating from a complicated web of
leftover state stockpiles, black-market arms dealers, globalized criminal networks, and corrupt
state officials. I highlight how the issue gained momentum, how it is connected to global
security, and identify key actors involved in the debate, their role, and how research evolved
from a small subset of conventional arms scholars to now include states, activists, lawyers,
doctors, and civil society as well as various other practitioners. To date, the United Nations has
formally adopted three policies (of various effectiveness) and one international control to deal
with small and light arms. Policies include the Small Arms Protocol, the Programme of Action,
and the Arms Trade Treaty; the first of which has no binding authority, where the two former
hold politically binding authority, and the one international control is a weapons-tracing measure
called the International Tracing Instrument. These controls are very useful theoretically,
however, domestic ratification is necessary for successful implementation; which is something
that states can not, as of yet, overcome. The second portion of the paper traces the evolution of
small and light arms research and advocacy programs to explain how proposed solutions ended
up being heard, and eventually adopted, in the United Nations. This section defines the proposed
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solutions to the small arms problem, such as: arms and equipment marking and tracing efforts,
arms reduction campaigns, targeted regional controls, international policy based norm-building
efforts, and the tightening of import and export controls. The third section evaluates the
effectiveness of firearms controls from micro- (e.g. personal firearms ownership controls),
national- (e.g. border controls), and international (e.g. tracing efforts or facilitating cooperation)
levels. Finally, the paper concludes that international controls rightfully target import and export
controls as well as illegal weapons networks; however, they (as of now) lack any strictly legal
power, and are mostly the result of strategic norm-building strategies meant to increase
communication and cooperation as opposed to coherently regulate and remedy the problem. Byand-large, one-size-fits all applications would have little effect on overall international security.
Current policies, unless states are willing to adhere to outlines policy recommendations, thus
provide a normative basis for what could eventually become legal regulations. Current policy is
the result of competitive actors who share information in an attempt to have sway in international
policy, which attempts to negate the state-centric conception of “national security,” and frame
the issue as a human rights issue (as opposed to a security concern). Because these third party
actors facilitate information sharing, states generally agree that problems linked to illegal
weapons proliferate human suffering. However, states are also reluctant to sign controls that
compromise security or vested economic interest. Because international agreements exist largely
to facilitate cooperation, firearms governance at micro and local levels have a far more important
role in the reduction and control of small and light arms. If the goal is to mitigate human rights
abuses and global violence, as assumed in this paper, then states are the gatekeepers of such
violence-reduction strategies. Because states create citizen security, social grievances that
facilitate the organization of opportunistic violence-seeking actors should be addressed in
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conjunction with arms control and reduction efforts to minimize the probability of conflict.
Generally, this paper finds that if policy exists to mitigate violence and disrupt illegal arms
trading, then controls should 1) tighten or adapt local regulations to accurately reflect locally
held views of firearms, 2) emphasize the state’s responsibility to implement the International
Tracing Instrument on all firearms imports/exports to target illegal trading, 3) standardize
international border import/export controls, and 3) successfully disarm (meaning the recall of all
opposition arms) and integrate opposition forces in post-conflict and transitional societies. While
the reduction of post-Cold War small arms is a critical component, this paper finds evidence that
implementing such policies lack efficiency, and that, by focusing on opposition disarmament,
Cold War-era small arms are indirectly reduced because most opposition groups (without
international support) are, more likely than not, armed with stockpiled Cold War-era small arms.
While this research generally confirms the approach the United Nations’ has taken, additional
discussion should focus on standards that would control future weapons flows as well as
comprehensive disarmament and reintegration procedures at local levels. Because arms reduction
requires either near-draconian policies or costly (mostly ineffective) buyback programs, future
control efforts should emphasize creating international law bodies capable of finding and
disrupting illegal, transnational criminal networks.
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1.1

The impact of small arms
Generally speaking, small arms became a salient issue during the immediate post-Cold

War era, in the mid 1990s. Because of the immense proliferation of small arms (and arms more
generally) during the Cold War period, developing countries were left with large stockpiles of
functioning weapons that were looted, stolen, traded, and/or sold. The Middle Eastern, Asian,
Latin American, and African regions were all, at some point in time, the recipients of small arms
supplies from major powers – primarily, though not exclusively, from the United States and
Soviet Union. While not wholly responsible for global arms proliferation, the former Soviet
Union and United States flooded developing states with small arms either to arm guerilla fighters
or prop up state forces and leaders in order to maintain regional dominance, and many of these
weapons were left within borders following conflict or simply unaccounted for. The following
pages detail what the small arms and light weapons problem is, and frames the origins of the
issue as a policy failure during the Cold War years.
Small arms (commonly lumped together with light weapons (SALW)) have qualities that
are distinguishable from conventional arms. Per the Small Arms Survey’s definition, small arms
consist of “revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns
and light machine guns;” and light weapons include “heavy machine guns, hand-held underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns,
recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of
anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS); and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm.” While
these definitions vary slightly, the core of the concept remains intact; the key difference between
small/light and conventional arms is portability. The portability of these weapons is appealing to
a variety of individuals and/or organizations where conceal-ability and lethality are the most-
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desired properties in a weapon. While conventional arms include the use of tanks, planes,
precision-guided munitions and such, small arms are much more accessible to third-party actors,
rebels, militias, and/or criminals.
Traditionally, Cold War-era conventional arms transfers would serve as either balancers
for proxy states, or, on occasion, were intended to exacerbate conflict to the ends of coercing
smaller states to ally with one of the great powers (Kinsella 1994). While the transfer of
conventional arms has lasting balance-of-power implications in hostile regions (Paul 1992),
small arms were generally not a threat to Cold War-era conceptions of power. Small arms were
typically underemphasized, and considered not to have any significant impact on international
security.
During the Cold War, great powers would arm various groups across the globe in order to
provide incentive for allegiance to either Communist or western forces. The United States
supplied arms in Central America to various militias or political groups in the region during a
time when there was intense global competition with the Soviet Union. Callanan (2010)
underscores a few of the foreign military-based aid entanglements: during 1970s, the United
States provided military and firearms-based aid to both El Salvador’s government and the
Nicaraguan Contras. U.S. forces armed and funded the failed resistance at the Bay of Pigs in
1961; Between 1960 to 1964, the CIA implemented “preventative” operations in regions of the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and British Guiana. When the Cuban revolution was successfully
achieved in 1959, the Callanan posits that the Soviets then used Cuba as a dispersion point for
small arms going into Central American countries as well other states – including North Korea.
To counter these arms flows, the US overtly promoted coups against both Truilljo in the
Dominican Republic and Castro in Cuba. In reaction to western arms-brokering actions, the
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Soviet Union further supported the FMLN opposition forces in El Salvador. Another example of
great power influence includes the transfer and training of U.S.-sanctioned defensive programs in
Venezuela. Additionally, further along in the Cold War, when the United States suspended the
sale of small arms to a few Central American states in response to accusations of increased
human rights abuses, Israel stepped in as a primary supplier of arms to Nicaragua, Haiti, and
Guatemala. In sum; small, light, and conventional arms alike flowed relatively freely in Central
America and the Caribbean regions.
The weapons used to arm militiamen and guerillas alike, in turn, were stockpiled (usually
hidden) and maintained within state borders, and these weapons were abandoned following the
end of conflict. In the Central American region, Bendaña’s (1999) research emphasizes how
small arms were supplied to the point of saturation, and when disarmament occurred many
civilians, ex-military, militiamen, and ex-fighters held on to arms illegally – most likely for
personal security reasons and fears of reprisal. While some weapons were dispersed among the
returning combatants and the general population, many stockpiles still existed en masse along
borders – which in turn were procured by illegal arms dealers and sold on global black markets.
These situations are further complicated when attempting to create policy that both ensures
citizen personal security while simultaneously disarming opposition parties in a comprehensive
manner (Potgieter 1999) – for example, farmer’s must own arms to ensure livelihood, and
effectively creating a policy accounting for instances of weapons ownership is near impossible.
Consequently, post-conflict small-arms policies are essentially rendered useless unless local
enforcement and policy accurately treats the issue.
Generally speaking, during the Cold War (and after as well), states have used far less
caution when treating the small arms problem – these weapons have been abandoned, illegally
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traded, and given trafficked under guises of and humanitarian assistance. Broadly speaking, it
was both economical and easier logistically for states to leave outdated and sub-par weapons
within conflict-ridden borders than to either transfer them back to the supplier or destroy them.
Take, for example, the Asian region: Smith (1999) reports that between Vietnam and Cambodia,
the United States abandoned the following weapons and associated ammunition in 1975:
114,000, .45 M1911A1 pistols; 946,000, 5.56mm M15A1 rifles; 961,580 additional rifles;
15,320, 7.62 M60 GMPG machine guns; and 65,500 40mm M79 grenade launchers for a total of
2,102,400 weapons. One could speculate that this was a rudimentary attempt at donating arms in
order for the state to form coherent authorities. Speculations aside, the abandonment of outdated
weaponry effectively created conditions under which weapons could be stockpiled and procured
by non-state actors following conflict, which hindered post-war reconstruction in fractionalized
states. While the United States abandoned massive quantities of weapons, there is evidence that
the Soviet Union illegally sold and traded, abandoned, and failed to secure arms and associated
equipment. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, massive numbers of weapons and
ammunition alike were unaccounted for or lost. In former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, illegal
arms networks began cropping up and illegal arms trading was conducted sometimes under the
guise of “humanitarian” assistance. As a result of this, millions of tons of light and heavy
weapons alike entered illegal networks across the world. Some examples Smith (1999) gives
include: Russian soldiers leaving East Germany and “losing” 81,000 tons of ammunition in the
process, 5,560 sub-machine guns illegally transferred to Bosnia in 1992, 3,000 Russian soldiers
were implicated in illegal arms deals in 1993, 12 containers of automatic rifles were found
masked as humanitarian supplies in 1993, and six former officials charged in Slovenia with
smuggling weapons labeled as humanitarian supplies in 1995. The Soviet Union and United
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States are not the only violators of questionable uses associated with these weapons. Smith
(1999) highlights additional violations of illegal weapons transfer include Islamic countries
pumping $160 million USD worth of weapons (grenade launchers, radios, anti-aircraft missiles)
into Bosnia (paid for with humanitarian funds between 1992 and 1994), and 600,000 and up to 1
million weapons being “lost” following protests in Albania in 1997 (of which, 30,000 were
recovered). Generally, these weapons flows were meant to bolster Islamic communities,
however, most of the time, these weapons are unaccounted for following conflict. Even after
Soviet collapse, global world powers continued to provide arms to weak states with priorexisting Cold War stockpiles, which further increased the availability of arms. Contemporary
African intrastate conflict is fueled in part with arms (past and present) supplied by major world
powers. For example, Smith (1999) further investigates how the Somali army abandoned
500,000 weapons during its civil war in 1992, and the United States donated 5,000 M16 rifles
and 5,000 pistols to the Somali police, which soon fell relapsed into the hands of criminals
thereafter. Additionally, in 1993, the Hutu government purchased AK-47s from Russia, which
armed the Hutu majority, which added fuel to the genocide of the Tutsi minority. Both during the
Cold War and after, small arms carried relatively little weight when looking in the face of
biological and nuclear weapons, and carelessness with small arms is highlighted by the casual
abandonment and illicit trade that occurred following Cold War and post-Cold War conflict.
In Africa (and the Middle East and Latin American as well), the AK-47 – Russia’s staple
small arm – is a highly-prominent and admired automatic weapon. More generally, the AK-47 is
the most-popular small arm in the world, and as such it has legendary status among violenceseeking entrepreneurs. “The AK-47, or Kalashnikov, named after its Russian inventor, was
placed into service in 1947 and has killed far more people than drones, missiles, or tanks. Loved
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by some (even featured on the national flag of Mozambique) and hated by others (especially
international peace groups), the AK-47 is a cheap assault weapon that when placed in the hands
of warlords and their sometimes child soldiers can not only destroy human life but can also
destroy a country through internal conflict and violence. Small arms manufactured in large
quantities by low-cost countries can be very dangerous.” (Rarick et al. 2013, p. 8). Through the
Central and Latin American illegal and illicit arms trade, some small arms are traded as far north
as the United States and Mexico. Where an AK-47 would fetch $100 in Central America (or $15
in Namibia, Mozambique, or Angola), United States’ citizens are willing to pay up to four times
more for such weapons (Bendaña 1999). Essentially, there is incentive for arms dealers to sell
their product in more industrialized countries – particularly states where gun culture is dominant.
In essence, one part of small arms problem involves illegal exporters and importers, and crossborder trade, which is highly difficult to target and control. This in turn complicates the nature of
the small arms problem, and highlights it as a transnational issue – even for developed states.
Within the broader context of social interaction, views of small arms have negative
cultural impacts and hinder positive societal norm building capacity. Jacklyn Cook (1999)
underscores how the AK-47 is not just another weapon; rather, it is the weapon and a universal
symbol of aggression and masculinity. Even members of criminal organizations identify the gunholding male as “big man,” and other terms glorifying hyper-militaristic societies emphasizing
the use of the AK as a legitimate method to resolve disputes. Aside from observations that these
norms have negative effects for broad societal health, Cook empirically concludes that policies
lack initiative aimed at integrating ex-military and guerilla combatants in post-conflict societies,
which is a key policy failure. This failure perpetuates emphasis on violence encourages the
probability that a non-reintegrated pool of ex-combatants, in conjunction with the glorification of
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the AK-47 and other weapons as legitimate means to resolve conflict, promotes historical
legacies of militant ideologies compounding to create a unique phenomena not treated in any
holistic, comprehensive policy.
Failures of disarmament policies to effectively deal with ex-combatants has further
effects for the conditions under which citizens live in post-conflict societies. In post-conflict
Zimbabwe, Nyambuya (1999) finds that a depressed economy, coupled with widespread poverty,
forces citizens to find alternative means of survival; and an easy way of securing domestic
finances is to find and sell leftover small and light arms stockpiles, which, in turn, creates local
arms-oriented economic competition. This competition among local arms dealers increases the
number of local small arms dramatically. In addition to increasing numbers and violent attitudes
towards dispute resolution, higher weapons numbers (in societies already experiencing high
levels of violence) are said to exacerbate incidents of gun violence. While existing illegal arms
are traded, legally imported arms continue to flow into the country – mostly to upgrade outdated
police and military weapons, which, again, occasionally fall back into the hands of criminals.
Because of increased weapons numbers, lax regulations, widespread poverty, local competition,
and strong consumer demand of small arms (from civilians and the state alike), the proliferation
of small arms in Africa occurred at a rapid rate.
Drug-trafficking organizations and locally embedded economies are another negative
consequence associated with the proliferation of small arms in resource-rich countries. In the
Latin and Central American context, the drug trade is a highly profitable and notoriously
dangerous business that is inseparable from small arms. In Peru, during the Cold War, armed
Marxist revolutionary movements capitalized on coca plant profits to strengthen their
organization, which became intertwined with the local economies to the point that citizens, and
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to some extent the state, relied on their rule and financial assistance. This situation eventually
devolved and pro-American state forces were pitted against “insurgent” communist forces,
thereby extending civil conflict (McClintock 2005). More recently, the spread of arms (acquired
primarily through looting) among factional warlords and drug dealers in both Libya and
Afghanistan resulted in widespread competitive violence among groups that undermined the role
of state authority (Newberg 2005, Strazzari 2014). Because acquiring small weapons is easy, and
the pay off can be great (as seen in Peru), it is in the interest of drug leaders to acquire such
weapons to either embed themselves in local economies, counter competing groups, or challenge
state dominance.
Drug-trafficking organizations, such as the Marxists in Peru, utilize small arms at micro
levels to the furthest extent possible, and competition among locally entrenched drug economies
promotes diffused violence both domestically and across borders. During all stages of drug
production (primary and secondary production, transportation, distribution, and consumption)
small arms are used. Research conducted by Jaramillo (1999) highlights the highly complex,
fragmented process of the drug trade as well as the intimate connection these organizations have
with small arms. During the primary stage, Jaramillo explains that local farmers allocate
shotguns and other traditional weapons customarily available to maintain security and migrant
workers growing coca plants. Though mostly done for cultural reasons, these arms also protect
the farmer’s crops and livestock. During the secondary processing stage, guards carry heavy,
semi-automatic and automatic weapons in order to ensure the safety of the product.
Transportation stages are where operators hide weapons and drugs in specialized compartments,
wheel wells, and on personnel to protect and conceal the product when crossing borders. The
distribution phase is commonly taken care of by highly organized organizations (mostly in
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developed states), and small arms are readily available during phases of distributing the product
down to the street level. Further, drug users (either recreational or habitual) generally have
higher rates of small-arms ownership as well, and of course at any stage violence is highly likely.
It is interesting, however, that arms are seen as a cultural component for Jaramillo at the micro
level and first stage of production. These localized views of firearms, consequentially, should be
taken into consideration when policymakers contemplate solutions to small arms issue areas.
Drug networks are not the only organizations capitalizing on the availability of small
arms. Where small arms contribute to illegal drug trades in Latin American countries, in African
countries small arms are used for illegal poaching, ivory trading, as well as diamond and gem
trading. Poachers pay arms dealers in Zimbabwe with ivory and precious gems in exchange for
weapons, and poaching activities have further emerged a highly profitable trade (Nyambuya
1999). In Namibia, black market arms dealers hijack leftover Cold-War small arms and take
advantage of insufficiently secured borders to spread illegal arms to criminals and associated
organizations for large profits (Ipinge 1999). In Swaziland, weapons are smuggled into central
depots and then distributed to criminals involved in car-hijacking organizations (Dlamini 1999).
In South Africa, theft, robbery, and reported loss of firearms drastically contribute to criminal
activities, car hijacking, poaching, and all the identified criminal activities above. To illustrate
how much of an issue small arms are: during the years 1993-1995, there were 516,289 firearm
permits were issued in South Africa; of those, 35,098 were stolen, 134,685 were reported lost,
and were 69,736 seized by the state (Dewey 1999). In sum, African-based violence entrepreneurs
have taken advantage of arms availability to create additional illegal resource-trade networks.
The modes by which these weapons are acquired are additionally important – especially
in the context of civil conflict. Moore (2012) finds that if rebel groups get a hold of advanced
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weaponry (most notably anti-aircraft MANPADS), civil conflict becomes more deadly. The
author also adds that if states receive advanced weaponry in opposition to rebels during conflict,
the conflict duration is likely to be prolonged. Rebels with only looted small arms are able to
sustain conflict, but upgrading such weapons escalates the lethality. In the 1980s, the
procurement of MANPADS (light anti-aircraft missiles) to Mujahedeen fighters helped defeat
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. “The transfer of MANPADS from state actors to non-state actors
has occurred and black- and grey- markets for such weaponry have been identified in several
countries including, inter alia, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq” (Jonsson 2014, p.
315). Non-state actors, most likely organized via income generated through one of the illegal
networks, purchase small, light, or conventional arms to the ends of achieving political aims
(MANPADS can be purchased for around $5000 USD on most occasions). If weapons are
donated from international powers, it is assumed that organizations have specified training
attached to such, and if organization is tightly regimented, the impacts on civil conflict are
significant. Because of these dynamics, small arms and light weapons can sustain conflict or/and
increase lethality.
Part of the reason why small arms were overlooked during the Cold-War years was
because the international community was largely concerned with concentrated, conventional
power as opposed to diffused power among factional states. These weapons were viewed as
secondary threats in the face of nuclear and conventional arms power: and as such, small arms
were seldom given a second thought in terms of international security (Smith 1999). For the most
part, arms producers and exporters were once considered to be the United States and the Soviet
Union. In the contemporary context, however, small arms producers and exporters alike are
usually the most powerful (and a few middling) states. According to the Small Arms Survey,
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there are over 1,000 global arms producers across 100 countries. Of these, the Survey catalogs
top the exporters (100-500+ million USD worth/year) of small arms to be the United States,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, Germany, Italy, and the Russian Federation. Generally
speaking, the world’s top and middling states have significant stake in global export of such
weapons, which does have implications for the possibility of strictly legal framework at the
international level. Because of the negative effects small arms proliferation has in post-conflict
and transitional societies, the issue is seen as a destabilizing factor from both domestic and
international perspectives. Domestically, illegal criminal organizations use small arms for
organizational purposes that promote localized competition and further spread transnational
criminal networks, which ultimately affect developed countries. At the state level, small and light
weapons acquisitions modes have an effect on civil conflict lethality and duration, as well as
opposition strength. While this section identified the various reasons how small weapons became
a global issue, the next section briefly identifies the actors involved in bringing the debate to the
floor of the United Nations.
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1.2

Actors in the debate
In observing some of the issues associated with small arms proliferation, a loosely linked

epistemic community composed of researchers, governments, scholars, NGOs, and civil society
converged to address and lend credibility to the issue and help find possible solutions. With the
aggregate of information researched, the community ultimately helped advocate and propose
legislation to the United Nations in an effort to facilitate consensus norm building at the
international level, which is included into the most-recent Arms Trade Treaty, which is a treaty
that addresses all arms-trading controls at all levels (from small arms up to conventional).
The first publication reacting to the dangers of small arms proliferation was the result of a
workshop hosted by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences with scholars Michael Klare,
Jeffrey Boutwell, and Laura Reed (aided with research from Aaron Karp – now of the Small
Arms Survey). The resulting publication was titled Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons (1994). The workshop presented the small-arms topic as an emerging
issue that required a policy-oriented solution, and framed the issue as a sub-topic of conventional
arms control. Klare distinguished small arms from conventional by identifying the intrinsic
qualities that small arms have – the compactness, cheapness, existing availability, ease of use,
reliability, and lethality. Klare’s empirical observations highlighted the power small arms have to
induce violence at multiple organizational levels.
The following year, there were kernels of Klare’s research echoed, when then-Secretary
General Boutros Ghali addressed the United Nations Security council announcing that he wished
to concentrate on international “micro-disarmament,” stating that small arms that were “actually
killing people in hundreds of thousands (UN Report A50/60 of January 25, 1995).” With this
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document, the United Nations secretary general effectively emphasized small arms as part of the
official arms-control agenda.
In 1996, Michael Klare and David Anderson (with a forward by Nobel prizewinner and
former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez) wrote A Scourge of Arms, which directly
confronts the issue of Cold War-era small arms proliferation in Latin America. In the
acknowledgements, the authors highlight that no existing database, yearbook, or governmental
organization addresses the issue of small arms in any substantive manner. The authors instead
relied on information from the Arms Sales Monitoring Project, the Federation of American
Scientists and Freedom of Information requests to collect and compile data. The book examined
the role of small arms in Latin America, their effects and offered additional policy
recommendations.
Perhaps in response to observations that the small-arms issue lacks data, or that the
United Nations placed emphasis on the problem, like-minded states pushed the issue forward by
pooling resources together in an effort to create a credible research program meant to investigate
these weapons. In 1999, the Small Arms Survey was established by the Swiss department of
Foreign Affairs. Additionally funded by the governments of Canada, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (with project support from Australia, Belgium, Denmark,
France, New Zealand, Spain, the United States, and United Nations agencies), the Survey has
since become the premier source of small arms information for the public and governmental
organizations alike. The Survey was established with the intent of producing a yearly
publication, and represents non-governmental organizations, research institutes, and participating
governments. Additionally, the program is consulted for policy guidance and conducts field
research across the world. The Survey’s research program started with a few like-minded states
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interested in understanding small and light arms dynamics by producing both qualitative and
quantitative research readily available for all interested parties. In response to the growing threat
of diffused small-arms violence, states began discussing possible avenues to curb such
widespread violence through mechanisms of regulating the global arms market (Keppler 2001).
The small arms problem has also been framed across multiple academic disciplines by
approaching the small-arms problem’s unique impact, as opposed to conventional arms where
impacts are more easily observed.1 One interesting question is: Why is state-to-state trading so
popular if it lacks any real positive economic impact (Smith et al. 1985)? Some human rights
research implies that small arms transferring policies to countries with known human rights
issues are intentional because of the inherent demand, thus underscoring a lack of any moral
policy towards arms-trading patterns (Yanik 2006). Legally speaking, practitioners stress the
importance of adhering to articulate guidelines and policy points spelled out in treaties (Biggs
2011). Researchers also cast the small arms issue as both a public health and public policy issue
(see the World Health Organization’s research). Despite how the issue is framed, research from
various fields helped raise awareness of the issue, and critically examine the role these weapons
have for international affairs.
Nongovernmental organizations also took a leading role in advocating issues at the
international level. Most notably, the efforts (Nobel prize worthy) of nongovernmental
organizations is most apparent with three organizations – the International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines – all of which significantly contributed to the
progress of arms control (Knopf 2012). While these NGOs focused on conventional arms

1

The next section explores some of the research conducted within the United States that connects violence
and gun ownership, as well as the connection between crime and illegal weapons.
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control, small-arms-control advocates attempted to piggyback off of the successes of landmine
ban successes NGO organizations achieved. A casual Internet search related to small arms and
associated problems (especially since the ratification of the most-recent UN arms treaty) refers
the user to the Small Arms Survey, the Arms Control Association, Freedom House, or Amnesty
International. Knopf concludes that “NGOs have directed more of their energy to working with
international organizations and influencing multilateral negotiating processes” with reference to
arms control. United Nations agreements came about not from only state-to-state political
negotiations; rather, the issue was raised through the efforts of academics, states, the United
Nations as well as NGOs (aided by research conducted in civil society referred to when defining
the issue).
While the general consensus was that the SALW problem is one that required a policyoriented approach, opposing, anti-arms-control norms successfully penetrated the debate at all
levels – especially when considering that United Nations’ values intrinsically advocate opposing
universalistic policy implementation. In response to the small arms issue, the National Rifle
Association, the primary international lobbyist of leading U.S. arms manufacturers, registered
with the UN as a Non-governmental organization in 1996 (one year after the United Nations
announced a micro-disarmament approach to mitigating human suffering) to hedge any
insistence of international small-arms-control policy. The following year, the NRA hosted a
global forum on sport shooting to bolster global support for defeating any small-arms-control
measures. Because the small-arms epistemic community framed the small-arms-control debate as
a human-rights problem, a reactionary coalition of anti-gun-control groups was formed to
combat universalist claims to legally binding framework (Grillot 2011). Anti-gun-control
advocates effectively argue that there are conflicting norms between gun control measures and
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those embedded within the United Nations; conflicting norms include the United Nations’
advocacy of the right to the right to domestic (extended to individual) self-defense, selfdetermination, and sovereignty.
Denise Garcia (2013) describes the evolution of global small arms norm-building as
moving through Finnemore’s defined stages: the first was during the 1990s, when there was a
lobby to put small arms on the international agenda (typified by Klare and other’s insistence), the
second was marked my like-minded states and organizations taking action (embodied by the
formation of the Small Arms Survey) by disseminating information, and the last phase where
norm builders develop effective mechanisms of peer pressure for control of the issue (currently
ongoing with United Nations’ policy-oriented actions). All of these stages theoretically
culminate into a critical tipping point, where small-arms controls are adopted and adapted by
states over time; however, norms builders are in constant competition with opposing norms
(embodied with the coalition of the NRA, weapons manufacturers, and pro-globalization
advocates). While relatively weak international controls are gradually implemented, opposing
norms generally prevent any meaningful, legal small-arms-control framework. Negotiated
policies, however, are rendered problematic because the multitudes of actors involved are all
vying for various aspects of this dynamic issue (Rogers 2009). Because problem solvers
(researchers and NGOs) desire control over one aspect of the issue, they are effectively hindering
political negotiations. Opposing coalitions of anti-weapons-control advocates compounds
already politically difficult negotiation measures, which in turn hinders both the speed and
adequacy by which policies are created.
Because the general consensus was that illegal small arms trafficking and associated
issues were considered a priority to international security, a non-formal epistemic community
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proposed possible solutions ranging from disarmament to weapons tracing measures, enhanced
border and import/export controls, and successful opposition reintegration programs. While there
is general agreement that small and light arms are problem areas, there are a multitude of actors
both vying to champion policy points, which hinders effective solutions. To address the
emerging issue area, a reactionary coalition of opposing NGOs effectively came together to
champion normative concepts such as free markets, sovereignty, and self-defense. These
opposing norms arguably, compounded with politically difficult negotiation procedures, resulted
in solutions that largely lack any enforcement among states where accountability is low. The
following sections of this paper evaluate the various solutions and policies implemented, which
is followed by an investigation as to whether or not controls are consistent with what researchers
find mitigates violence at the individual level.
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2

DEALING WITH SMALL ARMS

Currently, the small arms agenda, internationally speaking, has produced four solutions to
date – all implemented by the United Nations, which are: 1) the Protocol against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2) The
UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons provides the framework for activities
to counter the illicit trade in such arms, 3) the implementation of the International Tracing
Instrument, and 4) the Arms Trade Treaty. While there are several regional controls against small
arms, the three UN initiatives are the only international controls thus far – all of which are
politically binding agreements (which means that, for each state, it is optional to ratify the policy
or treaty and is not legal until each state has ratified it). These agreements, though holding some
weight, are implemented by-and-large to facilitate cooperative norm building among states, and
lack any concrete enforcement mechanisms. Though a universalist-oriented policy gained
traction at the international level, the resulting policies largely ignore fundamental state-oriented
problems – namely poverty, economic inequality, and weak political institutions. These small
arms policies highlight a multitude of difficulties facing states when coordinating policy aimed at
reducing global violence. The primary question answered in this section is: What should be done
about small arms?
Because state-to-state coordination problems at the international level affect policy
outcomes, recent research points to regional and local controls as the favored approach. By
localizing and curtailing policies that cater to regions on a case-by-case basis, policy can
theoretically target localized problem areas more effectively. Proponents of regional controls
argue that regional policies have the ability to regulate current stockpiles, as opposed to only
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regulating future weapons imports/exports. However, regional controls generally assume that
domestic and local institutions are effective and have the capacity to carrying out agreed-upon
policy.
The following section defines some of the proposed policy-oriented solutions at the
international, regional, and local levels, and explains how opposing norms have in part hindered
any legally oriented international small-arms policy. In addition, this section will consider how
controls affect on-the-ground situations.
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2.1

Issue area solutions
Within the small-arms literature, there is a growing consensus that regionally or

domestically based policies are most effective for disarmament and post-conflict development.
Some of these proposed solutions come from regional specialists and pinpoint hot-topic issues –
one issue in particular addresses how the state reintegrates military and guerilla forces (Galal
1999, Picasso 1999). When ending conflict, some of the most-critical actions states should take
into consideration are how to: 1) ensure demobilized rebels turn in arms, 2) ensure rebels are
willing to adhere to agreed-upon policies related to wartime crimes and prosecution, and 3)
reintegrate demobilized forces effectively and peacefully into society. Most of the time, former
combatants (especially those of higher rank) own small arms, and some even know where
weapons caches are stored and stockpiled – most of the time insecurely.
Former combatants in Guatemala adopted a comprehensive disarmament approach in
1996, when the task was to demobilize 3,000 Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca excombatants. Agreements included: 1) treating all wounded former guerrillas, 2) trying all
instances of human rights abuses, 3) allowing an outlet for foreign fighters to obtain citizenship,
and 4) creating integration commissions and foundations with representatives from both the
government and rebel forces for effective implementation (Orellana 1999). Generally speaking
Orellana describes the approach’s results as mixed, though generally favorable – according a
United Nations report (A/59/307) in 2005, the agreements lacked broad economic and social
programs for the former fighters, and those who relied on government assistance eventually
found themselves in tough situations once they went through the reintegration programs. Despite
its shortcomings, the agreements set general reintegration guidelines, and it certainly stimulates
conversation for future research related to transitional justice and reintegration. How
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reintegration occurs could have impacts for the resurgence of opposition groups as well as the
health of the public at large. Though an entire paper could be written on the various methods of
reintegration, this paper limits itself to considering how to control demobilized arms. Because of
how localized the issue is, regional controls should consider how to reintegrate combatants,
control arms, as well as provide sustainable support to avoid relapse into civil conflict.
Stockpiles could be collected and destroyed. Generally, proponents suggest that
controlling numbers is best to preventing illegal and illicit gun trading. Edward Laurance (1999)
estimates that initiatives in El Salvador, conducted by the UN, resulted in the collection of
142,000 weapons and 250,000 pieces of ordinance; in Hati, the US Army collected 30,000
weapons; and voluntary weapons collection was conducted in Panama, Nicaragua, Hati, and El
Salvador. While some of these programs were perhaps successful, they are more forceful and
resource-intensive than alternative means of collection. Less intrusively, El Salvador also
implemented a “Toys for Guns” and consumer-goods program coordinated by a host of religious,
civic, and political authorities. The Catholic Church coordinated with local business, the Rotary
Club, and the Legislative Assembly to successfully run the weapons-collection drive. With seed
money of $4,500 in the 1990s, the program collected a total of 4,277 weapons, 1,589 magazines,
and 52,693 pieces of ammo (Guitierrez 1999). Though these numbers are relatively small, the
economic investment was proportionally quite small. With reference to weapons collecting
during wartime: from my own experience, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces
implemented measures of small-arms control by locating and destroying hidden caches of
weapons with controlled detonations. Laurence in particular highlights the importance of
destroying Cold War-era stockpiles as a necessary first step towards the implementation of any
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meaningful small arms control. While intrusive policies are generally more successful,
community-organized collection efforts have also enjoyed modest success.
Policy implementation is hindered by a lack of reliable firearms-related data. As far as
researchers and academics are concerned, practitioners highlight that there is difficulty obtaining
consistent and valid data regarding small arms numbers and patterns more generally (Greene
2013, Karp 2012, 2013, Stoicescu 2013), especially when considering that the numbers that are
reported by most states is inconsistent at best, and nonexistent at worst. Part of the United
Nations’ policies were targeting the issue of unreliable data between states, however, many states
place emphasis on national security over arms agreements. Despite attempts to coordinate
international programs pooling together information, some states consistently fail to report points
of contact, reports detailing arms-control procedures, and many states have yet to ratify the Arms
Trade Treaty. Dryer et al. (1999) stress that the UN needs assert its role as international mediator
by setting rules regarding small arms reporting, transparency, oversight, and control. This,
however, is negated by Anthony (1999), who argues that general weapons control cannot act as
an effective substitute in place of state actions to address underlying domestic issues; namely
poverty, economic distribution, and ineffective governance. Where some researchers conclude
that tighter international controls are a necessary step towards effective arms control, others take
the position that state capacity and ineffective governance are to blame for the problem.
Despite resistance from anti-arms-control advocates and those critical of domestic
governance, the United Nations implemented several policies in response to the growing small
arms concern, the first of which in December of 1998 (one year prior to the establishment of the
Small Arms Survey) with resolution 53/111, titled the Firearms Protocol. Though the Protocol is
not either legally or politically binding, Article 2 states: “The purpose of this Protocol is to

29

promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to prevent, combat
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components
and ammunition.” For the most part, the measure was meant only to deal with illicit and illegal
arms networks associated with the mass distribution of former Cold War small arms and targeted
organized markets, and is further used as the foundation for all other small-arms agreements. The
protocol provides guidance on weapons deactivation, licensing procedures, security procedures,
training and technical service, brokering procedures, and how to settle firearms-trading disputes.
What the Protocol did not address was state-to-state transactions, legal trading, or “national
security” exceptions. Essentially, the resolution offered guidance and support if states were
compelled to implement firearm controls or legislative measures targeting illicit arms and global
trafficking.
In July of 2001, the UN adopted the Programme of Action (PoA), which is the second
iteration of policy designed to effectively tackle illicit arms trading. This politically binding
document defining measures states should take to effectively eradicate such illegal and illicit
activity (which would be legal if ratified at state levels). In all, there are 41 points for
implementation; the first 23 points of the Programme call for states to introduce national controls
while the rest call for regionally based points of program implementation and stipulates biannual
meetings to report progress. The PoA encourages states to implement criminal measures
associated with illegal small arms trade and ownership, create regional councils and
organizations pooling together information on local firearms issues, establish points of contact,
encourages enhanced small arms identification and record keeping measures, and offers guidance
on how to mark small arms for tracing and identification purposes. While participation is
voluntary, the measure is politically binding until ratification at the state level, the document was
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a second step towards consolidating globally accepted small-arms-control policy stances.
Specifically, some measures include reporting weapons numbers, implementing effective
domestic control legislation (which is a highly complex process requiring significant political
capital), encouraging manufacturers to etch unique markings on all arms exports, and
coordinating with and creating regionally based organizations to control the spread of these
weapons. Although these measures are spelled out in bullet points, most of the language is still
quite vague, lacking legal language, and states inconsistently report numbers (if at all), fail to
report to appropriate UN committees, and inconsistently apply points articulated in the
agreement, either because of domestic constraints or a lack of interest. Parker (2011) reported
that, of the signatory countries, five listed no point of contact, and 146 reported an email contact
for the Programme to contact. Of the 146 who provided a contact, 47 (39%) of the contacts
responded to an email in some way. Phone contacts similarly had a 29% contact rate, and Parker
concludes that, while states claim to strengthen borders and controls, they provide little details on
how borders are tightened, inspections are increasing, or how domestic controls are tightening.
While the Programme agreement was agreed-upon, there was considerable disagreement of how
the document’s language would read – most notably the United States, one of the largest
exporters of small arms, and the Bush administration vocally dismissed the potential of a legal
instrument aimed at controlling the trade of legal weapons. Generally, the Programme has served
much like the Protocol in that a bulk of the responsibility is transferred to the state in order to
effectively control weapons, associated stockpiles, and relevant materials.
Within the first two years of Programme implementation, states met regularly to discuss
controls and future measures, and, in 2006, the International Tracing Instrument was
implemented as a means of controlling weapons with states agreeing to report every two years on
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progress. The United Nations agreements stipulated that a program be established in each
country aimed at improving states’ small-arms import and export tracing and record-keeping
controls. The Instrument is an optional control ensuring that all small arms traded globally will
have identifiable marks that allow tracing back to host states. While methods range from laser
engraving to hand etching, the ultimate method was left up to host states. The Instrument fails to
address ammunition and associated parts related to small arms. Aaron Karp (2006) finds that the
proponents of the political agreement, similar to the Programme, articulated that a political
agreement as advantageous in several ways: 1) it applied to all states in the UN (not only those
directly involved in negotiations), 2) comprehensive legal framework would delay
implementation or agreement, and 3) states can address the tracing issues individually.
Advocates for legal framework naturally advocated for stronger normative frameworks and
greater binding force. In 2010, Parker (2011) finds that just under 1/3 of all states reported
updates on the ITI’s implementation, and generally concludes that very few states separate the
ITI as a separate arms-control measure.
While the Instrument is another step forward for arms-control advocates, it is by no
means a comprehensive policy to address the need for global cooperation. In order to
successfully implement the Instrument successfully, states must offer clear information regarding
marking requirements for manufacturers, national contact points, voluntary disclose weapons
numbers, because there was no discussion of implementing enforcement offices at either Interpol
or the United Nations (Karp 2006). The Instrument does, however, offer guidance on how to
mark and implement markings on imports, exports, and military and police to civilian
transactions. While these regulatory efforts largely lack any enforceable components, they do
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represent a continual integration of policy on the part of norm entrepreneurs and pro-armscontrol advocates.
The latest policy attempt at the international level centers itself more on conventional
weapons, though was able to incorporate existing small-arms policies under the same banner.
The Arms Trade Treaty aims to regulate weapons trade in arms ranging from small to
conventional (including tanks, aircraft, and associated equipment). Signed in April, 2014,
currently 121 states signed the treaty (signaling intent to join the treaty), and 53 adopted and
have ratified it. Though suffering from the same vague language as all previous regulatory
controls, the ATT is meant to be the next step in global arms regulation by holding annual
meetings and updates regarding state implementation, and includes all weapons trading to
include conventional and heavy weapons (and aims to come into effect in December of 2014).
While the Treaty is another step forward for arms control, it essentially reiterates with both the
Protocol and Programme detail and adds little weight to the small and light arms controls that
already exist for small arms, but did manage to be incorporated within the larger weaponscontrol framework. While the four UN measures lack any comprehensive legal credibility, they
do represent continual (though perhaps minimal) attempts to prevent unlawful weapons trading
and, more broadly, loss of human life.
Small arms controls at the international level are essentially political agreements, lacking
any enforceable legal framework until they are ratified by all states. This policy failure (perhaps
due to coordination problems or conflicting interests on the part of producer countries), in turn,
fails to adequately enforce stipulated bullet points meant to target a complex global networks of
both legal and illegal arms trading stemming either from domestic political restraints or willful
rejections of cooperative efforts. These issues also more generally represent game-theory-like
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dilemmas commonly emphasized throughout comparative and international studies literature,
and further complicate the prospect for international cooperation. The next section of this paper
questions whether international agreements, if they could be implemented effectively, would
have any positive effect on international security. Because there are debates over whether tracing
and tighter border controls are an effective measure of containing these weapons, there is a need
to further investigate what controls have a meaningful impact on the reduction of violence –
which is the assumed goal of policy. Where this section detailed some solutions at state and
international levels, and highlights the complexity of such problems, the next section tackles the
issue of effective policy. Thus the question becomes: In a world where all small arms controls
are implemented, which controls effectively target violence levels?
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3

EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY

Small arms are blamed for a multitude of problems, and there is little doubt that they
contribute to widespread violence among human beings. The mass diffusion of the small arms
results in a fractured, multi-faceted and dynamic problem among developed and developing
states alike. But are these problems because of the quantity of small arms, or are there underlying
issues yet to be dealt with? While political mechanisms are slow to induce change, national
governments have at their disposal the ability to create effective regulatory efforts that would
dampen the effects of the widespread use of weapons, given the political will exists. But what
controls effectively mitigate violence? The policies adopted by the United Nations imply that
tracing and record-keeping, regional controls, and enhanced border security combat illegal arms
trading, which results in fewer criminal organizations, opposition forces as well as localized
violence. There is, however, reason to doubt that fewer weapons results in less violence, and this
section seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of various control propositions by exploring the
connection between guns and violence.
Various firearm controls have been advocated and lobbied for by a pool of specialists
passionately involved in small arms issue development. A bulk of gun-violence research is most
prevalent in the United States and other western countries, and this research adds some evidence
that suggests that reducing firearms numbers and implementing concentrated and targeted
legislative measures reduces gun violence. It should be noted, however, that in the developing
world, weapons dynamics are obviously far removed from that in the west, and most likely
developing states face more-immediate matters of state capacity and mitigating corruption.
However, the case of the United States is an important to consider because of the diversified
state laws towards weapons as well as providing a case study on the effects of lax border

35

regulations. Generally, the United States, as a case, helps add evidence that confirms or denies
the hypothesis that less arms leads to less violence, or, additionally, that tighter legislation leads
to less weapons.
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3.1

What controls are effective?
In exploring what factors prevent firearm violence, Mark Duggan (2001) explores the

connection between firearm ownership and homicide rates. By using state- and national-level
sales levels of the popular magazine Guns & Ammo as a proxy for firearm ownership, and
comparing it to National Center for Health Statistics, Duggan contradicts findings that increasing
conceal and carry permits reduces crime rates. In other words, that the probability that a heroic
stranger concealing a weapon prevents crime is a low probability. Instead he suggests that by
increasing weapons numbers, incidents of firearm homicide predictably increase as well. To
complement this research, by using Gun Control Index data (measuring rigidity of gun control)
and data from the CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, Gius’ (2008) findings
suggest that stricter gun-control legislation decreases ownership and, as a result, gun-related
crime. Though these studies pertain directly to the United States, these findings add empirical
weight to the claim that decreased access to weapons in turn reduces instances of firearm
homicide. The interesting dynamic in the United States is that there is a patchwork of varying
firearms laws, and situations arise when more-tightly regulated states border states with loose
regulations.
If less weapons equates to less crime, then why are there illegal weapons markets, and
what are these weapons used for? Some research finds that illegally procured arms have moresignificant impacts on violent crime. Researchers explain that illegal guns are nearly impossible
to track (once they enter the illegal pool), have further geographical reach, and are used in
homicides more often than their legal counterparts. In addition, introducing stricter firearms laws
(especially in states of close proximity) may increase the likelihood that firearms will be sold and
traded illegally. Kahane (2012) finds that, in the American context, “federal and state laws
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restricting gun ownership for some individuals have given rise to the illegal market for guns” (p.
631). These illegal weapons, in turn, are used to commit various crimes. By using the Incident
Database from South Carolina (1991-1994), Stolzenburg et al. (2000) find there is a relationship
between illegal gun availability and violent crimes, gun crimes, and juvenile gun crimes.
Additionally, offenders of these crimes do not substitute knives for guns; implying those owning
illegal firearms prefer to use them during the commission of crimes. In the United States, guns
are purchased in states with weak regulations and illegally sold in states with strong regulations,
and the closer two opposing states are the more likely this trade occurs (Knight 2013). Thus if
the goal is to reduce violence, tougher regulations may paradoxically increase the flow of illegal
and illicit small arms, which in turn increases the likelihood that these weapons will be used for
violence. Because tighter weapons controls induce black-market trading, regulatory efforts
should occur in conjunction with disarmament and firearms-reduction programs, which indicates
that there are considerable investments to be made if regulations are to be taken seriously.
Within the United Nations’ policies, most of the control is given to the state, and it is
stipulated that legislative measures should tighten lax gun laws (this generally is meant to target
weapons not meant for collecting or recreation). However, because varying “community
standards” exist and the views of firearms change according to locality, Blocher (2013)
concludes that local levels of government should be the primary regulators of firearm controls.
Because rural communities emphasize gun culture, self-sufficiency, and hunting more than their
urban counterparts, weapons regulations should account for these two fundamentally opposing
views with reference to firearms regulation. In sum, Blocher answers the regulatory question by
setting central guidelines, and delegating control procedures and responsibilities to adapt to local
standards. While this approach may have favorable results in the case of the United States and
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other western states, local institutions at the local level in developing countries would most likely
lack institutional longevity or credibility to account for such variation. The solution of delegating
responsibility to the local level presupposes effective regulatory control across locals, which is
something that cannot be uniformly assumed.
If reducing weapons numbers reduces crime, then buyback programs should reduce
weapons numbers, and effectively reduce crime. While there is some evidence to suggest that
stricter controls on firearm ownership reduce crime, Phillips et al. (2013) conduct a time series
analysis, and find that the reduction of weapons via buyback programs had little-to-no impact on
violent crime in the United States (and if there is an effect, it takes years to see the results of
such). This finding highlights important aspects of buyback programs – namely that most
weapons collected are out of date, non-functional, or are weapons that are typically not
connected to violent crimes (instead they are perhaps smaller caliber or sporting weapons). The
authors did, however, note that there was a successful buyback campaign conducted in Australia
where, in response to a massacre that killed 35 people, legislative action was taken to collect
65,000 weapons in an effective buyback program. This implies that, for buyback programs to
maximize effectiveness, there must be collections of scale in order to make any substantial
impact. These findings have impacts for regional arms control policy and disarmament strategies
in post-conflict societies, and, drawing on this research and the modest success of the “Toys for
Guns” program in the Latin context, buyback generally appear to require highly coordinated
efforts or significant capital investment to be effective.
Interestingly enough, there are studies that highlight how environmental conditions and
factors can result in security dilemmas that contribute to the increased potential of gun-related
violence. Shrira et al. (2013) find that societies that are exposed to deadly disease and parasites
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are more prone to commit increased levels of violence. Because the existential threats in diseaseprone societies, in-group interactions (as opposed to interactions more broadly) are emphasized
and banding together with familiar faces is a common defensive tactic. This banding effect in
turn increases the fractionalization of society, which increases ethno-centrist views and promotes
xenophobia, which in turn dehumanizes the out-groups. This dehumanization increases chances
of violence in threatening environments – especially if weapons are easily available. Thus the
localization of arms policies, legislation, punishment, and norms are a highly local matter, which
is why blanket policies are next to impossible in combating both firearm violence and illegal
weapons trading. The United Nations’ agreements from this perspective are justified in
delegating responsibility to the state level. Because small arms dynamics and associated issues
are so heavily localized, the imposition of top-down approaches are generally considered to be
ineffective in combatting locally rooted problems.
To supplement localized arms reduction efforts, societal norm building is a critical
component to reducing violent crimes committed with guns. Dr. David Hemenway, in framing
gun violence as a public health issue, opines that a number of norm-construction strategies aimed
at reducing gun violence are possible and public health practitioners should advocate such
change. Anti-gun campaigns should take measures similar to that of anti-smoking campaigns.
Anti-smoking campaigns market smokers as compulsory and weak in contrast to tobacco
company portrayals of cigarette smokers as modern, alluring, and mysterious. Guns should
additionally be delegitimized as masculine, and instead be condemned as instruments of
unwarranted violence. News outlets could give more attention to weapons used in crimes, and
how the violence stems from illegal arms trading, which would raise awareness of the issues with
illegal weapons buying, selling, and trading. Dr. Hemenway effectively highlights the need for
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norm entrepreneurs to capitalize on recent normative victories and emphases the need for
cooperative norm building as a means of combatting firearms-based violence.
The rise of transnational gun markets, in turn, has far-reaching consequences for states
more broadly. When evaluating how effective regulatory efforts are, policy aims to streamline
border controls and procedures, which accounts for the transnational nature of the problem.
Gagliardi (2012) reports that transnational illegal arms trading threaten the traditionally held
norms of state sovereignty, contributes to the modern enslavement of migrant workers, and are
globally destabilizing. The author notes that Mexican drug cartels take advantage of lax U.S. gun
regulations to fuel drug wars, and maras(gangs) undermine government tax-collection efforts in
Guatemala and El Salvador. Additionally, many of these maras (60%) extradited from the United
States return illegally. In reaction to the growing issue of illegal arms trading, there is evidence
to suggest that tracing and tracing efforts could have an impact on violent crimes. However,
weapons control is only one dimension of the problem – more broadly, transnational crime
involves drugs, money laundering, prostitution, human slavery, robbery, vandalism, and a
number of other illegal activities. Because small arms are so intimately connected to organized,
transnational criminal networks, appropriate agencies should stress pooling of information to
effectively target such organizations, and in this way the United Nations appropriately advocates
weapons tracing, record-keeping, and tighter border controls. Regionally based controls should
generally adhere to agreed-upon regulations of border control as well as import/export measures.
In the Balkans, licensing efforts are largely under utilized, and transparency efforts and quality
by-and-large vary drastically. Because of the variation in border security, one-size fits all
approaches (with the exception of strengthening borders and improving customs procedures) are
not advisable (Grillot 2010); instead, states should strive to enforce existing mechanisms in
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place. Generally, once weapons enter grey or black markets, they become incredibly difficult to
control or locate. Salton (2013) advocates starting with simple enforcement of origin and enduser certificates (the paperwork authorizing general and special arms exports and imports). “The
legal restrictions on sales are at best vague and uncertain, and violations of those regulations
carry no adequate relief, equitable or otherwise” (Salton, p. 414). Though understandably
addressed in the multiple United Nations’ policies targeting international trafficking, these
mechanisms are left up to national regulations and regional controls and are unevenly enforced
from state to state, which negates any positive impacts.
Alam (1999) describes how the United Nations offers assistance to countries if requested.
In 1995, and UN security resolution mandated that, in Rwanda and Burundi, a team of
investigators 1) collect reports on the sale of arms, 2) investigate charges that local factions are
training military forces, 3) identify illegal arms-acquisition processes, and 4) recommend policy
mechanisms that would limit such activity. While such support is available, few states utilize
such services. One notable conclusion of such investigations, however, was that the Rwandan
genocide and illegal mineral networks in Burundi were connected with illegal small arms. Thus
the United Nations does offer services; however, proposed solutions at the state level are perhaps
not considered even despite security council resolutions and UN investigations.
With reference to civil conflict, rebel and state-controlled arms supplies and transfers
have impacts on the lethality and duration of civil conflicts. Suzuki (2007) finds that large
increases in the number of conventional arms imports prior to war do not increase the chances of
civil conflict. Given this; What effect do small arms have on conflict, and would looking at
increasing small arms help predict the onset of civil conflict? While outside the scope of this
research, it certainly would be an interesting study. There is, however, research exploring the
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role that small and light arms play in conflict (See the Impact of small arms section of this
paper). As far as regulations are concerned, consider that when the Dayton Agreements ended
the Serbian/Muslim war, conventional arms agreements were situated within existing regional
controls, and, in addition, were consistently restructured to accommodate military balances of
power – including the United Stated bolstering arms to the Muslim-Croats. These agreements did
not, however, address small arms, civil-military arms restructuring, or local controls (Tanner
2000), which affected the long-term stability of the region and undermines micro disarmament
concerns, which increases the possibility of the identified issues associated with weapons
proliferation.
So which controls effectively mitigate violence? In drawing conclusions from this
section, I draw on some important observations; namely that 1) fewer illegal firearms may
reduce crime, 2) no research emphasizes the lethality of sporting or collectible weapons,
implying that such ownership is negligible, 3) tougher regulations, if not uniformly implemented
in the rest of the region, increase the potential for illegal markets to emerge, 4) arms-reduction
efforts require significant political will or startup capital (and perhaps time) to prove effective,
and 5) conventional arms can provide military stability in post-conflict societies, yet small arms
disarmament should be accounted for to help prevent future violence.
Because of the issues connected to small arms (as identified in the first section),
reintegration and disarmament measures should be implemented proportionally because,
following conflict, opposition arms are presumably considered illegal. Because illegal weapons
are connected to increased crime (as identified in this section), current international policy
correctly identifies illegal arms trafficking and sales to be connected to increased global
violence. This evaluation generally concludes that, because collection efforts are difficult, policy
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should instead focus on ex-combatant reintegration, enhancing local governance capability and
legitimacy, regionally targeting firearms policies and laws, and the tightening import and export
controls.

44

4

CONCLUSIONS

The first part of this paper explained that small arms constitute a threat to global health and
security for a number of reasons. First, small and light arms are lightweight, cheap, lethal,
portable, reliable, and can be operated with minimal training. Secondly, massive small-arms
stockpiles across the world left over from global Cold War-era rivalries resulted in a cache of
weapons ripe for illicit and illegal arms deals. Third, the diffusion of weapons, through both
illicit and illegal means, has societal, political, and environmental impacts when considering that
networks involved in trading stolen property, drugs, ivory, precious minerals and stones, and
weapons themselves operate with impunity. As a result, the global diffusion of small arms
facilitates the spread of radical ethnic and religious tensions. Additionally, these weapons are
linked to the formation of illegal drug- and resource-trafficking groups who have the means to
secure small arms at budget prices. Because of these dynamics, there are implications for both
domestic and international security (one ought not look any further than the current crisis in
Syria and Iraq involving the Islamic State as an example of effective arming and organization
that began with small arms).
The second part of the paper explained how the issue of small arms became an
international priority. Beginning in the 1990s, there was an accumulation of knowledge that
addressed the growing threat of small arms. An epistemic community composed of researchers,
academics, NGOs, and governments facilitated information diffusion, which ultimately reached
the United Nations and marketed the issue as a serious destabilizing force for international
security. The UN, despite facing opposing, anti-gun-control reactionary forces, implemented
agreements targeting the control, reduction, and inventory of small arms. While these measures
lack legal language and uniform enforceability, they are still touted as examples of states
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agreeing to sweeping policies meant to target global violence. Even though enforceability is low,
language is vague, and producer states argue that “national security” concerns trump
international agreements, it is important to evaluate the method of international policy formation.
Additionally, the hesitancy to regulate arms markets is because activists in major producer states
are able to organize effective anti-arms-control reactionary coalitions in opposition to the global
epistemic pro-arms-control community. Further, among arms-control advocates, various actors
wrestle to champion policy approaches to the small-arms issue (Rogers 2009), which results in a
multitude of fragmented policy options with little consensus. The lack of state reporting and
information delivery generally negates the initial momentum that small-arms agreements gained
during the 1990s. However, while states generally ignore requirements of the agreements, there
is some intrinsic value in states at least acknowledging any arms-control policies. Generally, the
function of the United Nations’ various international policies should be viewed as facilitating
information flow, and advocating greater international cooperation as opposed to creating
comprehensive solutions to a highly complex and localized problem.
The last portion of the paper highlights important observations for effectively mitigating
violence, which draws on research that highlights the determinants linked to the reduction of
gun-related violence. General recommendations point to a need for greater local capacity in the
development and institutionalization of locally effective gun laws. Additionally, regulations that
are too rigid may paradoxically promote illegal arms trading because new markets demand
regulated firearms. In this view, policies the United Nations has followed are justified in
delegating responsibility to domestic levels; however, because there is a division between the
intrinsic value of firearms from urban to rural cultures, local controls and authorities are
necessary to both account for these views as well as combat the proliferation of illegal arms. To
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supplement this, van der Graaf (1999) contends that successful small-arms controls must
incorporate and facilitate trust between security forces, police, and citizens, and localized
legislation must target the regulation of the weapons that tend to be tied to violent crime. Thus if
policy does not account for localized issue areas, and does not maintain trust between the state
and the citizen, the small-arms problem is bound to persist.
Not all countries follow internationally dictated advice, and leaders choose which values to
emphasize over others; however, his paper generally points to a need for governments to enhance
border security by targeting both arms imports and exports as a means of controlling the
proliferation of arms. It may be coincidence that former Cold-War proxy states (and those rich in
natural resources) are targets for civil conflict, or it could be because actors capitalize on what
resources (weapons in conjunction with natural resources) are available to further political
agendas. Whether the policy emphasizes weapons reduction or regulation strategies, it is in the
interest of state and the general public alike to eliminate the underlying social conditions
frequently associated with the rise of civil conflict – namely poverty and GDP per capita
disparities. While controlling weapons will not eliminate the possibility of violence, it would
theoretically limit an opposition’s ability to form effectively – these actions, however, do not
eliminate or accurately address concepts such as greed or grievance articulated by conflict
scholars.
The control of arms trading is quite obviously an ambitious project for the United Nations.
The fact that a pool of activists, NGOs, academics, researchers, and states continually push small
arms control and are willing to face anti-arms-control advocates in reaction is a test of Martha
Finnemore’s three-phase theory of norm diffusion theory. While norm entrepreneurs are
facilitating the policy creation process by diffusing information, a critical mass may very well be
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forming; if this is such, it will be interesting to see if globally accepted arms-control norms will
be genuinely internalized and have effects on international conduct. Another future research
avenue is to test Finnemore’s norm-diffusion hypothesis by applying the case of small arms.
This paper has explored the problem of small arms for an international perspective,
identified the proposed solutions from a policy perspective, and evaluated the soundness and
effectiveness of such policy. More abstractly, this paper has reviewed small arms research and
the historical development of associated policy. Because civil conflict and transnational criminal
activity appear to be going nowhere soon, it is perhaps advantageous to identify and research
innovative methods to effectively mitigate the effects of mass proliferation of arms (either
conventional, light, and small) – which is perhaps one of the most-difficult security challenges in
the contemporary world.
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